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Abstract	
This	paper	set	out	to	study	the	methods	used	to	finance	High	Speed	Rail	(HSR)	in	France.	It	
began	by	introducing	the	concept	of	high	speed	rail	and	the	history	of	rail	development	in	
France	to	provide	context	for	the	state	of	rail	in	France	today.	Rail	development	history	
revealed	a	longstanding	tradition	of	debt	which	has	prevailed	in	modern	times.	As	France	
continued	to	develop	its	rail	network	it	shifted	its	financing	methods	from	public	debt	financing	
to	public-private	partnerships.	This	case	study	of	French	HSR	financing	revealed	the	true	cost	of	
an	extensive	network	which	is	often	overlooked	when	the	country	is	cited	as	a	model.	The	
paper	concludes	with	lessons	to	be	learned	about	France’s	willingness	to	subsidize	HSR,	an	
ideology	which	may	not	be	successfully	transposed	to	other	countries.		
Introduction	
North	American	proponents	of	high	speed	rail	often	cite	the	success	of	France’s	rail	system	by	
the	length	of	track	they	have	laid,	the	positive	environmental	impact,	or	the	high	ridership	it	
has	garnered.	However,	this	case	study	of	France’s	high	speed	rail	network	indicates	that	none	
of	these	indicators	are	telltale	of	sustainable	success.	
High	speed	rail	first	appeared	in	Japan	in	1964;	the	line	operated	between	Tokyo	and	Osaka	
(Henn	et	al.,	2013).	Henn	et	al.	(2013)	state	that	the	success	of	the	Japanese	Shinkansen	HSR	
rail	prompted	the	European	Union,	and	foremost	France,	to	invest	in	similar	technology	by	the	
late	1970s.	Today,	there	are	24	countries	with	HSR	systems	and	several	other	countries	with	
systems	under	construction	(Worldwatch	Institute,	2015).		
	In	2011,	French	President	Nicholas	Sarkozy	said,	“The	TGV,	it’s	France”	but	train	travel	has	
been	an	important	part	of	French	culture	since	long	before	the	high	speed	trains	started	
running.	As	early	as	1914	the	train	was	recognized	for	its	potential	to	mobilize	troops	to	the	
German	border	rapidly.	Since	then,	the	technology	has	rapidly	evolved	to	allow	for	speeds	up	to	
380	kilometers	per	hour.	High	speed	passenger	rail	has	offered	shorter	travel	times,	the	
convenience	of	city-center	stations,	and	competitive	fares	since	1981	when	the	first	French	line	
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connecting	Paris	and	Lyon	line	was	inaugurated.	However,	convenience	has	come	at	a	price	for	
the	publicly	owned	operator.	The	agency	is	crippled	by	debt	and	undergoing	restructuring	
which	may	put	growing	the	French	high	speed	rail	network	on	hold.				
This	report	will	provide	a	brief	history	of	rail	in	France	followed	by	a	discussion	of	the	key	
decision	makers	over	the	last	80	years.	It	will	explain	the	structural	changes	brought	about	by	
two	major	rail	reforms	and	assess	if,	and	how,	these	changes	have	contributed	to	the	growing	
rail	debt.	The	evaluation	of	debt	leads	into	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	various	high	speed	rail	
financing	methods	used	in	France	and	concludes	on	the	successes	and	failures	of	these	models	
as	lessons	learned.		
Literature	Review	
What	is	High	Speed	Rail?	
A	HSR	system	is	comprised	of	both	infrastructure	and	rolling	stock	(European	Union,	2004).	
Infrastructure	is	the	physical	track	and	stations	while	rolling	stock	are	the	cars	and	trains	which	
utilize	the	track	(European	Union,	2004).	The	European	Union	(2004)	definition	states	that	both	
the	infrastructure	and	the	rolling	stock	must	be	able	to	guarantee	safe	travel	at	speeds	
exceeding	200	kilometers	(km)	per	hour	on	upgraded	existing	track	and	speeds	exceeding	250	
km	per	hour	on	new	track	(Worldwatch	Institute,	2015).	True	HSR	systems	run	on	new	
“exclusive	and	independent	tracks”,	however,	conventional	track	has	been	upgraded	to	support	
speeds	up	to	200	km	per	hour	(Rodrigue,	2013).		
Costs	and	Financing	
Henn	et	al.	(2013)	establish	HSR	construction	as	“mega	public	infrastructure	projects”	with	high	
upfront	capital	construction	costs	in	comparison	to	operating	costs.	They	state	that	choosing	
the	optimal	funding	mechanism	requires	an	understanding	of	overall	costs,	cost	sharing	
between	partners,	and	risk	allocation.	They	outline	the	three	phases	of	infrastructure	financing	
as	a	pre-project	stage,	secondly	construction,	and	lastly	operations	and	maintenance.	Campos	
and	de	Rus	(2009)	further	disaggregate	construction	costs	to:	land	acquisition,	planning,	
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studies,	followed	by	building	costs	which	incorporates	terrain	preparation	and	platform	
construction,	and	finally	“all	rail-specific	elements”.		
These	various	facets	of	HSR	costs	impact	the	financing	methods	for	HSR	development.	
Developing	a	network	is	costly	and	economic	returns	on	all	the	lines	may	not	suffice	in	justifying	
the	overall	costs.	Countries	need	to	weigh	the	financial	costs	and	benefits	in	addition	to	the	
social	and	societal	benefits	which	may	ensue	when	deciding	on	proper	financing	methods.	 
Why	France	Built	HSR	
France’s	first	high	speed	rail	line	known	as	the	TGV,	connecting	Paris	and	Lyon,	was	inaugurated	
in	1981	by	President	Francois	Mitterand	(Henn	et	al.,	2011).	Freemark	(2011)	argues	that	since	
the	TGV’s	opening,	HSR	has	successfully	lured	passengers	away	from	commercial	airlines.	
Around	83	percent	of	French	residents	have	ridden	the	TGV,	a	percentage	not	far	from	the	
amount	of	Americans	which	have	flown	(Freemark,	2011).	
The	TGV	alternative	was	pursued	in	France	because	it	provided	a	“low-carbon	travel	
alternative”	given	that	the	majority	of	the	country’s	electricity	comes	from	nuclear	plants	
(Freemark,	2011).	The	HSR	system	improved	passenger	travel	times	by	removing	passenger	
trains	from	freight	rails,	decreasing	congestion,	in	turn	increasing	freight	line	capacity	(Ashiabor	
&	Wei,	2013;	Ross,	2011).	Lane	(2012)	corroborates	that	this	decongestion	also	applies	to	
airports	and	better	flight	on-time	performance.	City	residents	have	shown	a	clear	preference	
for	reliable	transportation	(Ross,	2011).	The	TGV	carries	about	100	million	passengers	per	year	
which	amounts	to	1.5	times	the	total	population	(Freemark,	2011).	In	2016	the	system	spanned	
just	over	2,000	km	with	an	additional	670	km	under	construction,	see	Figure	1.		
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Figure	1:	Map	of	2016	HSR	Network	(SNCF,	2016)	
Prior	to	2014,	the	Reseau	Ferroviaire	de	France	(RFF),	the	national	public	rail	infrastructure	
owner	was	responsible	for	building	the	TGV	lines	with	a	combination	of	funding	from	“local,	
regional,	and	national	governments”	as	well	as	track	useage	fees	(Freemark,	2011).	The	track	
useage	fees	were	passed	down	to	the	SNCF,	Société	Nationale	des	Chemins	de	Fer	Français,	
which	translates	to	"national	society	of	French	railways",	that	operates	both	the	TGV	and	
intercity	trains	(Henn	et	al.,	2013;	Freemark,	2011).	However,	the	high	construction	costs	of	the	
HSR	lines	in	France	placed	the	RFF	in	substantial	debt,	circa	33.7	billion	euros	in	2013	(de	la	
Brosse,	2014).		
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In	2012	a	new	legislation	was	passed	which	on	January	1st,	2015	merged	the	RFF	and	the	SNCF	
into	the	new,	state-owned	SNCF	Reseau,	the	sole	manager	and	proprietor	of	the	French	rail	
system	(SNCF	Reseau,	2015).	The	merger	was	the	result	of	a	major	rail	reform	in	France	and	the	
attempt	to	consolidate	rail	management	into	one	organization	(SNCF	Reseau,	2015).	This	
consolidation	also	resulted	in	the	transfer	of	a	portion	of	RFF’s	debt	to	the	SNCF	(de	la	Brosse,	
2014).	Today,	the	SNCF’s	debt	is	steady	at	7.4	billion	euros	(SNCF,	2015).	
According	to	Garmendia	et	al.	(2012)	French	high	speed	rail	corridors	proved	to	have	economic	
impacts	which	reinforced	the	dominance	of	the	regional	capital	rather	than	the	regions	
surrounding	it	because	it	facilitated	“connection	to	the	national	capital	or	big	metropolitan	
areas”.	It	particularly	undermined	the	growth	of	“former	industrial	sub-regions”.	Their	research	
unearths	the	need	for	policies	that	promote	equitable	corridor	development.	The	European	
Union	created	the	European	Territorial	Strategy	as	a	means	to	promote	“territorial	cohesion”	
but	according	to	Garmendia	et	al.	(2012)	“these	strategies	have	not	been	clearly	materialized”.		
Talk	of	HSR	in	the	US	
In	2008	the	Obama	administration	set	aside	$8	billion	in	the	American	Recovery	and	
Reinvestment	Act	(ARRA)	to	spur	high-speed	rail	development	in	the	United	States	(Reutter,	
2010;	Ashiabor	&	Wei,	2013).	In	2009,	the	Federal	Railroad	Administration	(FRA)	created	the	
High	Speed	Intercity	Passenger	Rail	(HSIPR)	to	oversee	the	creation	of	high	speed	passenger	rail	
corridors	(Ross,	2011).	The	ARRA	funds	were	distributed	by	the	FRA	to	six	major	corridors	to	
conduct	feasibility	studies,	of	which	three,	Florida,	Ohio,	and	Wisconsin	returned	the	money	
and	describing	it	as	“wasteful	federal	government	spending”	(Ashiabor	&	Wei,	2013).		
Opposition	to	the	creation	of	high	speed	rail	in	the	US	stems	from	the	costs	of	creating	such	a	
system	in	a	country	which	spans	over	2,500	miles	from	east	to	west	coast	(Lane,	2012).	Air	
travel	has	become	convenient	and	widely	used	in	the	US,	hence	an	effective	HSR	system	in	the	
US	would	not	run	the	entire	length	of	the	country	but	rather	connect	pairs	of	cities	100	to	600	
miles	apart	(Lane,	2012).	Lane	(2012)	argues	that	there	is	not	enough	population	centrally	
distributed	in	the	US	to	warrant	“intra-continental	rail	trips”	therefore	the	system	network	
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proposed	by	the	FRA	focuses	on	connecting	regional	hubs	instead	to	create	regional	rail	
corridors.		
Opponents	question	the	likelihood	of	this	form	of	rail	being	able	to	rival	low-cost	airlines	and	
personal	automobiles	for	intercity	trips	(Lane,	2012).	A	1987	study	by	Bonnafous	estimated	that	
over	30	percent	of	French	HSR	patrons	switched	modes	from	air	transport	and	a	little	under	20	
percent	came	from	automobiles.	Spain	saw	a	shift	in	rail	share	from	14	to	41	percent	in	the	
Madrid	to	Seville	corridor	after	the	opening	of	the	HSR	route	(Gonzalez-Savignat,	2004).	Lane	
(2012)	argues	that	the	willingness	to	pay	for	intercity	air	fares	demonstrates	that	consumers	
are	willing	to	pay	a	premium	for	shorter	travel	times.	To	best	rival	air	travel,	HSR	stations	
should	be	built	in	“centralized,	dense,	and	highly-accessible”	locations	to	provide	riders	with	
access	to	other	modes	of	transportation	(Lane,	2012;	Ashiabor	&	Wei,	2013;	Gonzalez-Savignat,	
2004).	
The	success	of	rail	experienced	in	Europe	may	be	challenged	by	the	enduring	perception	of	the	
automobile	is	a	symbol	of	social	class.	A	2006	survey	of	Americans	indicated	that	“69	percent	of	
Americans	still	described	driving	as	something	they	liked	to	do”	(Becker	&	George,	2011).	
However,	an	advantage	that	train	travel	presents	over	automobile	is	the	ability	to	complete	
other	tasks	during	the	trip,	and	the	ability	to	reach	speeds	of	up	to	200	miles	per	hour,	three	
times	the	US	legal	highway	speed	limit	(Gonzalez-Savignat,	2004).		
Proponents	of	HSR	argue	that	the	technology	has	fewer	negative	externalities	than	“short-haul	
air	travel”	given	that	the	technology	is	powered	by	electricity	(Lane,	2012).	Opponents	argue	
that	that	very	little	electricity	in	the	US	comes	from	‘clean	sources’	such	as	hydro	and	nuclear	
(O’Toole,	2009).	The	US	Energy	Information	Administration	concluded	that	in	2014,	67	percent	
of	electricity	in	the	US	came	from	fossil	fuels.	Bradley	Lane	also	argues	that	trains	provide	a	
more	comfortable	travel	option	as	airplane	seats,	and	legroom	space,	have	been	declining	
steadily	in	size	since	the	1970s	(Elliott,	2015).	Garmendia	et	al.’s	(2012)	research	found	that	for	
trips	between	2	and	3	hours	there	is	direct	competition	between	HSR	and	air	travel.	However,	
for	trips	under	2	hours	their	research	showed	that	HSR	travel	was	the	preferred	mode.		
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Economic	benefits	could	be	derived	from	the	monetization	of	time	savings	from	reduced	car	
congestion	which	the	Economist	estimated	in	2005	cost	the	US	$63.1	billion	dollars	yearly	
(Becker	&	George,	2011).	One	study	found	that	a	$10-million-dollar	investment	in	transit	capital	
generated	$30	million	in	revenue	from	surrounding	businesses;	an	equal	investment	in	transit	
operations	was	found	to	generate	$32	million	in	business	revenue	(FXM	Associates,	2008).		
California’s	HSR	Project	
November	of	2008,	the	voters	of	California	approved	Proposition	1A,	a	high	speed	passenger	
train	bond	which	allocated	$950	million	to	the	development	of	HSR	in	their	state	(California	
Transportation	Commission,	2014).	The	decision	to	go	build	HSR	in	California	has	been	highly	
contested	by	“the	California	Legislative	Analyst’s	Office,	State	Treasurer,	California	High-Speed	
Rail	Peer	Review	Group,	State	Auditor,	a	State	Senate	Committee,	and	other	independent	
reviewers”	due	to	the	lack	of	long-term	funding	plans	(Reason	Foundation,	2013).	
The	California	High	Speed	Rail	Authority	(CHSRA)	oversees	the	construction	of	the	bullet	train	
whose	first	phase	spans	from	San	Francisco	to	Anaheim	via	twelve	stations	over	500	miles.	
Phase	2	adds	a	leg	connecting	Sacramento	to	Merced	and	San	Diego	to	Los	Angeles	(CHSRA,	
2015).	Phase	1	is	projected	to	open	in	2029.		
Only	$12.5	billion	were	secured	in	2013	through	the	Proposition	1A	bonds	and	federal	grants	
(Reason	Foundation,	2013).	In	2014,	an	additional	revenue	stream	was	added	by	the	California	
legislature;	25	percent	of	the	cap-and-trade	fees,	or	revenue	from	the	private	companies	
purchasing	carbon	allowances	would	be	allocated	to	high	speed	rail	(Vartabedian,	2015;	Young,	
2015).	While	cap-and-trade	fees	could	result	in	one-quarter	of	a	billion	to	one	billion	dollars	
annually,	this	would	amount	to	a	maximum	of	14	billion	in	cap-and-trade	fees.	Cumulatively,	
these	funding	sources	amount	to	a	little	over	26	billion	which	is	less	than	half	of	the	project’s	
estimated	cost	of	68	billion	dollars	(Vartabedian,	2015).		
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History	
The	first	rail	line	in	France	opened	in	1827	and	was	used	to	transport	coal.	Ten	years	later	the	
first	French	passenger	rail	line	opened,	financed	entirely	by	private	citizens.	It	was	the	law	of	
1842	which	enacted	French	State-financed	passenger	rail	expansion	(Loi	du	11	juin	1842).	Rail	
was	quickly	perceived	as	a	lucrative	enterprise	and	businesses	offered	to	finance	their	
construction;	by	1883	there	were	26,000	kilometers	of	track	and	over	25	million	euros	(	1918	
francs	adjusted	to	2016	euros)	spent	of	which	close	to	19	million	were	private	monies	(Picard,	
1918;	France-Inflation,	2016).	This	can	be	regarded	as	the	time	period	in	which	France	began	
using	public-private	partnerships	to	finance	rail.	However,	the	State	took	on	building	costs	but	
was	not	the	operator.	By	1920,	after	World	War	One	and	six	years	of	inflation,	rail	operators	
were	losing	money	(“The	story	of	French	rail”,	2015).		
The	Players	
The	SNCF	–	Société	national	des	chemins	de	fer	français	or	National	society	of	French	railways	–	
was	created	in	1937	as	a	response	to	the	cumulative	rail	operator	debt	which	reached	37	billion	
francs	in	1936.	For	the	next	45	years	France’s	five	largest	rail	companies	merged	to	form	a	
single	French	network	operated	by	the	State	(“The	story	of	French	rail”,	2015).		
On	31	December	1982,	the	1937	agreement	expired	and	SNCF	became	an	ÉPIC,	defined	as	a	
state-owned	enterprise	responsible	for	managing	a	public	service	of	an	industrial	and	
commercial	nature.	As	sole	shareholder,	the	French	State	has	full	operational	autonomy	(“The	
story	of	French	rail”,	2015).	
Despite	public	management	and	State	oversight,	the	SNCF’s	debt	ballooned	to	over	100	million	
francs	in	1990	(“Comptes	transports	de	la	Nation”,	2013).	The	SAAD	–	Service	annexe	
d’amortissement	de	la	dette	–	a	debt	servicing	agency	was	devised	in	1991	as	a	means	of	
structuring	SNCF	debt	and	managing	annual	State	allocations	designated	to	pay	off	this	debt.	
Sectioning	off	a	portion	of	the	debt,	5.7	billion,	was	thought	to	make	the	remainder	of	the	
SNCF’s	debt	more	manageable	(Cours	des	Comptes,	2002;	“La	dette	de	la	SNCF”,	2007).	In	
2006,	Eurostat,	in	a	letter	addressed	to	the	French	National	Institute	of	Statistics	and	Economic	
12	
	
	
Studies	requested	that	SAAD’s	debt	be	reclassified	as	public	debt	(“La	dette	de	la	SNCF”,	2007).		
The	French	State	took	on	SAAD’s	debt	in	2007	and	the	agency	was	terminated	(Eymery	et	al.,	
2015).	
The	first	major	French	rail	reform	in	1997	created	the	RFF	–	Réseau	Ferré	de	France	–	who	
became	the	rail	infrastructure	manager	(Eymery	et	al.,	2015).		The	RFF	was	conceived	to	build	
new	systems	with	capital	borrowed	from	private	financial	markets.		
On	January	1,	2015	a	second	rail	reform	went	into	effect	in	which	the	RFF	was	replaced	by	SNCF	
Réseau	in	an	attempt	to	unite	all	rail	responsibilities	under	the	purview	of	the	SNCF.	SNCF	
Réseau	handles	network	access,	rail	traffic,	maintenance,	and	engineering	and	consultancy	
work	(“Press	Release”,	2015).		
Rail	Reforms	
The	first	French	rail	reform	enacted	in	1997	had	three	overarching	objectives:	separate	the	
management	of	infrastructure	and	operations,	balance	the	SNCF’s	books,	and	better	financing	
methods	for	infrastructure	projects	(Cours	des	Comptes,	2002;	“La	réforme	ferroviaire”,	2013).	
The	result	of	the	separation	was	a	partially	integrated	and	simultaneously	disjointed	division	of	
labor	where	the	infrastructure	manager,	now	the	RFF,	was	no	longer	the	operator	but	
continued	to	delegate	systems	operations	such	as	timetabling	and	maintenance	to	the	
operator,	the	SNCF	(de	la	Brosse,	2012).		
To	address	the	solvency,	two-thirds	of	the	SNCF’s	quickly	accruing	debt	(20.5	billion	euros)	was	
shifted	to	the	RFF,	see	Figure	2	(Cours	des	Comptes,	2002;	de	la	Brosse,	2012).	The	majority	of	
this	debt	originated	from	mass	investment	in	five	lignes	a	grandes	vitesses	(LGV),	or	high	speed	
rail	lines:	LGV	Sud-Est	(opened	in	1981),	LGV	Atlantique	(1990),	LGV	Rhone-Alpes	(phase	1-	
1992,	phase	2-	1994),	LGV	Nord	(1993),	and	LGV	Interconnexion	Est	(1994)	(Eymery	et	al.,	
2015).		While	these	changes	improved	the	SNCF’s	debt	it	gave	the	RFF	a	difficult	start.		
The	SNCF	was	required	to	pay	tolls	to	the	RFF	in	order	to	make	use	of	the	tracks.	The	tolls	were	
fixed	in	1997	and	1998	but	by	1999	the	RFF	increased	the	tolls	by	61	percent	from	915.9	million	
euros	to	1,824	million.	Despite	the	increase	in	revenue	from	the	tolls,	the	RFF’s	operating	
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income	remained	negative	even	before	it	began	debt	payments	(Cours	des	Comptes,	2002).	
Although	this	inefficiency	was	noted	in	2002,	it	was	never	properly	addressed.	Instead,	the	RFF	
continued	to	increase	its	tolls:	6.4	percent	in	2009,	11	percent	in	2010,	and	11.7	percent	in	
2011	slashing	SNCF	profits,	causing	a	rise	in	debt	over	that	period	shown	in	Figure	2		(Rousseau,	
2011).			
Combined	the	SNCF	and	RFF	had	41	billion	euros	debt	in	2013	up	from	36.1	billion	when	the	
reform	was	instituted,	see	Figure	2;	that	number	was	projected	to	reach	60	billion	by	2022	if	
nothing	was	done	(Eymery	et	al.,	2015;	de	la	Brosse,	2012).	The	ongoing	debt	crisis	set	the	
stage	for	another	reform.	
	
Figure	2:	SNCF	and	RFF	Debt	1990-2013	(in	billions	of	Euros)	(Eymery	et	al.,	2015)	
The	second	rail	reform	was	adopted	as	law	on	August	4,	2014	and	enacted	in	2015	as	a	means	
of	reversing	the	structural	changes	brought	about	by	the	1997	reform	(“La	reforme	ferroviaire”,	
2013).	This	reform	was	highly	contested	by	the	largest	SNCF	employee	union,	the	CGT.	The	
union	published	a	study	on	the	consequences	of	the	reform	which	estimated	that	9,000	to	
10,000	full-time	employees	would	be	laid	off	by	2020	(Jacqué,	2015b).	
In	an	assessment	of	the	1997	reforms,	the	Cours	des	Comptes,	“the	supreme	body	for	auditing	
the	use	of	public	funds	in	France”	referred	to	the	relationship	between	the	French	State,	the	
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SNCF,	and	the	RFF	as	“complex”	and	“somewhat	opaque”	(“Our	organization”,	2015;	Cours	des	
Comptes,	2002).	The	creation	of	the	RFF	diluted	the	responsibilities	of	both	organizations,	
disempowering	them	from	fully	carrying	out	their	duties	(“La	reforme	ferroviaire”,	2013).	
Collaboration	would	have	been	needed	to	succeed.	However,	collaboration	was	unlikely	when	
the	SNCF	and	RFF	both	had	budget	deficits	and	were	funded	from	the	same	sources:	the	French	
State	and	each	other	(Cours	des	Comptes,	2002).			
The	reform	seeks	to	reduce	costs	by	cutting	redundancies	which	the	1997	reform	created	by	
dividing	the	SNCF	without	compromising	railway	industry	working	conditions.	It	sets	out	to	
restructure	the	SNCF’s	management	to	streamline	decision	making	and	provide	greater	
transparency	to	the	public	(“La	reforme	ferroviaire”,	2013).		
Debt	
There	has	been	much	controversy	around	the	growing	amount	of	debt	incurred	for	rail,	but	the	
question	of	whether	this	debt	is	“good”	or	“bad”	has	not	been	addressed.	A	2005	report	on	
French	debt	commissioned	by	the	French	Minister	of	Finance	stated	that	public	debt	can	be	
reasonably	incurred,	and	paid	for	by	future	generations,	if	the	debt	contributes	towards	public	
goods	from	which	future	generations	will	benefit	(Pebereau,	2005).	According	to	this	definition	
of	debt,	further	investment	in	rail	is	justified	even	when	current	revenue	is	insufficient	because	
it	is	a	social	good.	In	such,	the	question	that	poses	itself	is	how	much	good	debt	leads	to	a	bad	
debt?	The	following	section	of	the	report	will	seek	to	assess	where	the	debt	is	being	generated	
in	order	to	determine	what	type	of	debt	is	being	incurred.	
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Prior	to	2015,	there	were	three	primary	financers	of	the	rail	network:	the	RFF,	the	SNCF,	and	
the	government,	they	formed	the	“train	triangle”,	see	Figure	3	(Eymery	et	al.,	2015).	French	rail	
operator	debt	(RFF,	SNCF,	and	SAAD)	more	than	doubled	between	1990	and	2013	despite	the	
French	government	taking	on	the	SAAD’s	8.5	billion	euro	debt	in	2007,	refer	to	Figure	2	(Eymery	
et	al.,	2015).		
Figure	3:	"Train	Triangle"	Monetary	Exchanges	(Eymery	et	al.,	2015)	
The	growing	debt	is	the	result	of	the	RFF’s	annual	budgetary	deficits,	which	grew	at	an	
increasing	pace	in	the	past	decade	(Eymery	et	al.,	2015).	The	financial	imbalance	was	said	to	be	
due	to	an	inflation	in	production	costs,	catching	up	on	a	backlog	in	railway	maintenance,	
spending	on	large	infrastructure	projects	and	on	the	interest	due	on	money	borrowed	for	said	
projects	(“Réforme	du	system	ferroviaire”,	2014).		Figure	4	shows	that	the	majority	of	the	costs	
not	paid	for	are	on	the	infrastructure	side,	the	responsibility	of	the	RFF	up	until	2015.		
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Figure	4:	2011	Infrastructure	and	
Service	Cost	Distribution	(“Réforme	
du	system	ferroviaire”,	2014)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The	RFF’s	funding	came	in	large	part,	about	two-thirds,	from	the	tack	usage	fees	that	the	SNCF	
paid	and	the	remaining	thirds	from	subsidies	coming	from	the	public	authorities.	However,	in	
2008	public	authority	subsidies	were	reduced	from	an	average	of	2.6	billion	euros	to	only	2.2	
billion.	This	constriction	of	public	funding	did	not	go	unnoticed	by	the	RFF	whose	annual	deficit	
began	markedly	increasing	as	shown	in	Figure	5	(Eymery	et	al.,	2015).	
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Figure	5:	Annual	RFF	Deficit	Excluding	Expansion	Costs	2004-2013	(Eymery	et	al.,	2015).	
As	a	means	of	off-setting	this	reduction	in	public	subsidies	the	RFF	increased	its	tolls	to	the	
SNCF,	as	was	noted	in	an	earlier	section.	The	SNCF	compensated	for	this	increase	in	tolls	by	
raising	ticket	prices,	passing	on	the	cost	increase	to	the	consumer.	Between	2008	and	2013,	
France	saw	a	20	percent	increase	in	the	cost	of	train	travel,	refer	to	the	black	line	in	Figure	6,	an	
increase	far	surpassing	inflation	(blue	line)	and	air	travel	(green	line).	This	increase	in	RFF’s	tolls	
launches	a	viscious	cycle	in	which	increasingly	expensive	train	tickets	shift	riders	to	other	
modes,	reducing	ridership,	leading	to	fewer	trains,	resulting	in	even	less	toll-revenue	for	the	
RFF	(Eymery	et	al.,	2015).	
	
Figure	6:	Index	of	Travel	Prices	from	1998-2013	in	France	(Eymery	et	al.,	2015)	
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In	2013,	the	RFF’s	expenses	(excluding	rail	expansion	projects)	were	as	follows:	45	percent	
operating	costs,	38	percent	infrastructure	maintenance,	and	17	percent	debt	servicing.	In	
addition,	the	RFF	had	an	aggressive	rail	expansion	budget	which	far	exceeded	the	amount	of	
resources	available.	The	agency’s	2013	deficit	was	3	billion	euros,	of	which	half	were	linked	to	
expanding	the	system	and	the	other	half	operating	expenses	(Eymery	et	al.,	2015).		
Discussion	of	debt	pre-reform	
This	section	of	the	report	sought	to	understand	why	debt	was	being	incurred	in	order	to	judge	
whether	or	not	this	debt	was	taken	on	in	the	interest	of	the	public.	Budgetary	analysis	showed	
that	over	one-third	of	operating	expenses	were	for	system	maintenance	and	that	half	of	the	
budgetary	deficit	was	due	to	investment	in	rail	expansion	(Eymery	et	al.,	2015).	These	cost	
overruns	indeed	contributed	to	the	maintenance	and	expansion	of	a	national,	public	good	for	
past,	current,	and	future	generations.		
However,	it	must	be	noted	that	these	spending	decisions	did	not	happen	solely	in	response	to	
organizational	restructuring	in	1997	with	the	separation	of	the	SNCF.	While	the	relationships	
and	agreements	in	the	“train	triangle”	lack	transparency,	it	is	clear	that	political	pressures	for	
the	expansion	of	high	speed	rail	coupled	with	reduced	State	subsidies	in	France	have	led	to	
budgetary	deficits;	not	the	constant	creation	and	liquidation	of	public	agencies.	Rail	reforms	
have	allowed	inconspicuous	debt	restructuring	as	a	means	to	undertake	additional	costly	rail	
expansion	projects.		
Figure	7	shows	that	despite	an	additional	485	kilometers	of	HSR	opening	between	2008	and	
2013	(a	33	percent	increase	in	the	supply	of	track)	train	kilometers	traveled	increased	by	only	2	
percent	compared	to	a	combined	increase	of	25	percent	by	car	and	plane	(Eymery	et	al.,	2015).	
Eymery	et	al.	(2015)	attribute	this	narrow	growth	to	the	stark	increase	in	the	cost	of	train	travel	
relative	to	these	other	modes	which	originated	from	a	reduction	of	State	subsidies	by	0.4	billion	
euros	(refer	back	to	Figure	6).	It	must	be	noted	that	despite	this	small	gain	relative	to	that	of	air	
travel,	HSR	passenger	traffic	“exceeds	domestic	air	transport	by	a	factor	of	more	than	10”	
(Crozet,	2014).	
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Figure	7:	2008-2013	Change	in	Kilometers	Traveled	by	Mode	(Eymery	et	al.,	2015)	
Since	January	1,	2015,	when	the	RFF	was	absorbed	back	into	the	SNCF	as	SNCF	Réseau,	there	
has	been	no	disclosure	of	where	that	33.6	billion	euro	debt	(in	2013)	has	gone.	A	third	party	
analysis	of	the	2017	reform	has	identified	three	possible	alternatives	for	dealing	with	the	debt	
(Eymery	et	al.,	2015):	
1. State	takes	on	a	portion	of	the	debt	
The	French	government	did	not	internalize	the	20.5	billion	euros	which	were	transferred	to	the	
RFF	in	1997	which	weighed	heavily	on	the	RFF	until	2014.	The	first	option	is	for	the	government	
to	take	on	this	debt	and	its	cumulative	costs,	a	sum	estimated	to	be	close	to	25	billion	today.	
Eymery	et	al.	(2015)	argue	that	the	State	made	a	poor	decision	in	1997	and	should	be	held	
liable.	Furthermore,	they	ascertain	that	interest	rates	are	at	a	“historic	low”	and	the	State	is	
able	to	take	on	this	debt	with	such	a	favorable	rate.		
2. Debt	payment	rescheduling	
Rescheduling	the	debt	payments	would	allow	to	spread	out	the	installements.	High	speed	rail	is	
considered	a	long	term	investment	whose	benefits	and	financial	return	are	deferred	to	
subsequent	generations.		
3. Reduction	in	interest	rate	
A	2013	report	on	the	RFF’s	debt	stated	that	the	organization’s	interest	rate	was	4.13	percent	
(Eymery	et	al.,	2015).	The	French	treasury’s	borrowing	rates	for	10	years	have	fallen	far	below	
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that	amount,	hovering	around	1	percent	in	2015,	see		Figure	8	(France-Inflation,	2015).	A	
decrease	in	the	interest	rate	would	significantly	reduce	the	interest	owed	on	the	debt.		
	
	Figure	8:	Historic	Trend	of	10	Year	Borrowing	Rate	for	France	&	USA	(France-Inflation,	2015)	
If	the	totality	of	the	debt	was	transferred	to	SNCF	Réseau,	without	any	of	the	aforementioned	
debt	management	options	implemented,	or	new	funding	sources,	debt	will	continue	to	rise	
until	2025	at	a	decreasing	pace,	as	the	principal	of	SNCF	Reseau’s	accrued	debt	is	paid	off	
(Eymery	et	al.,	2015).		
As	a	means	for	controlling	expansion	related	debt,	the	August	4,	2014	law	stipulates	that	the	
SNCF	cannot	take	on	any	expansion	projects	which	exceed	a	debt	to	income	ratio	determined	
yearly	by	parlement	(Art.	L.	211-10).	Only	when	projects	are	financed	by	the	State,	territories	or	
other	entities	can	this	ratio	be	exceeded	(Art.	L.	211-10).	This	stipulation	is	a	means	of	
deflecting	financial	risk	from	the	SNCF	onto	another	entity.	While	it	is	a	sound	concept,	it	is	not	
retroactive	and	effectively	does	nothing	to	relieve	current	levels	of	debt	for	the	four	HSR	
projects	underway.		
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French	HSR	Financing	Models	
Public	debt	financing	
The	high	levels	of	debt	incurred	by	the	SNCF	prior	to	the	1997	reform,	discussed	earlier,	were	
the	result	of	public	debt	financing.	The	SNCF’s	initial	strategy	was	to	construct	the	lines	with	the	
greatest	joint	financial	and	social	returns	first.	This	selection	method	led	to	the	construction	of	
Paris-Lyon	route	on	the	TGV	Sud	Est	which	had	an	expected	rate	of	return	of	12	percent	(Henn	
et	al.,	2013).	The	TGV	Sud	Est	was	financed	entirely	with	SNCF	debt	with	project	costs	at	1.28	
billion	euros	(in	2016	euros)	(Domergue	et	al.,	1997).	It	proved	to	be	a	large	success	when	
returns	exceeded	15	percent	and	the	debt	was	fully	amortized	just	12	years	after	opening	
(Henn	et	al.,	2013).		
However,	the	success	with	this	financing	method	quickly	tapered	out	as	less	profitable	routes	
were	built	and	the	SNCF	no	longer	had	the	ability	to	“self-finance”	(Domergue	et	al.,	1997).	
These	less	profitable	routes	were	partially	paid	for	by	public	authorities	to	guarantee	that	the	
SNCF’s	minimum	return	criteria	of	8	percent	could	be	met	(see	Figure	9)	(Henn	et	al.,	2013).	
																											 	
Figure	9:	Financing	HSR	Projects	Until	1997	(Henn	et	al.,	2013)	
Debt	&	subsidy	combination	
The	1997	rail	reform	shifted	the	financing	responsibility	away	from	the	SNCF	onto	the	RFF	
where	projects	were	“guaranteed	by	State	appropriations	or	by	borrowing”	(Domergue	et	al.,	
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1997).	After	the	reform,	the	RFF	became	the	sole	project	undertaker,	assuming	the	risk	for	
construction	and	maintenance.	Projects	were	financed	with	a	blend	of	RFF	debt	and	“a	portion	
of	full	investment	cost”	supplemented	by	a	range	of	subsidies	from	the	State,	local	authorities,	
the	European	Union	(EU)	and	for	transnational	lines,	neighboring	states	as	well	(Henn	et	al.,	
2013).	
Two	high	speed	rail	lines	were	constructed	with	this	finance	structure,	the	LGV	Est	(phases	1	
and	2)	and	the	LGV	Rhin-Rhone;	neither	of	which	met	the	RFF’s	required	8	percent	return	
threshold.	To	compensate	for	the	projected	low	financial	returns,	the	RFF	financed	less	than	30	
percent	of	each	and	the	remainder	was	a	blend	of	State,	EU	and	regional	funds	(Henn	et	al.,	
2013).	
Public-private	partnership	(P3):	design-finance-build-run-maintain	
The	first	public	private	partnership	of	its	kind,	the	Tours-Bordeaux	TGV	extension	is	being	
designed,	financed,	built,	and	will,	in	2017,	be	run	and	maintained	by	a	single	entity	–	COSEA.	
COSEA	is	a	“special-purpose	entity	created	to	build	the	rail	line	by	Vinci,	a	big	French	
construction	and	concession	company”.	Vinci	has	created	additional	special	purpose	units	to	
finance	and	run	the	line.	The	financing	entity,	LISEA,	raised	3.8	billion	euros	in	equity	and	loan	
capital	and	received	3	billion	in	public	government	subsidies	and	1	billion	from	the	RFF	(“Where	
there’s	a	will”,	2014).	
The	total	project	costs	came	in	at	8	billion	euros,	a	sum	too	great	for	the	publicly-owned	SNCF	
(“Where	there’s	a	will”,	2014).	In	exchange	for	Vinci	building	the	Sud	Europe	Atlantique	TGV	
line	from	Tours	to	Bordeaux,	the	SNCF	agreed	to	pay	tolls	to	run	their	trains	on	the	line.	LISEA	
has	set	the	tolls	at	48	euros	per	train	per	kilometer	a	sum	which	will	plunge	the	line	into	
insolvency	according	to	the	SNCF.	The	SNCF	announced	that	they	would	lose	between	150	and	
200	million	euros	a	year	in	part	due	to	the	tolls	and	because	ridership	projections	have	dropped	
substantially	since	2009	(Jacqué,	2015).	
In	2009,	the	SNCF’s	Tours-Bordeaux’s	2017	ridership	estimates	were	17	million	yearly	riders.	
However,	with	the	ongoing	French	financial	crisis,	the	2017	estimate	was	revised	to	13	million	
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riders	due	to	increasing	car-sharing	and	flying	mode	shares.	LISEA	disagrees	with	the	estimates	
and	believes	that	the	one-hour	time	savings	brought	by	the	new	line	will	increase	the	
attractiveness	of	the	line	by	20	percent;	their	ridership	projection	is	18	million	yearly	
passengers	(Jacqué,	2015).	
LISEA	announced	that	they	are	not	opposed	to	reducing	the	toll	as	long	as	the	SNCF	returns	the	
train	frequency	to	what	it	had	been	in	2009,	prior	to	the	lower	ridership	estimates.	The	contract	
between	LISEA	and	the	SNCF	does	include	a	clause	which	will	allow	renegotiation	a	year	and	a	
half	after	the	line	opens	based	on	the	economic	returns	of	the	line	(Jacqué,	2015).		
Discussion	
French	policy	makers	and	presidents	have	shared	considerable	enthusiasm	for	high	speed	train	
since	its	launch	in	1981	(Barone	et	al.,	2011).	This	has	enthusiasm	has	translated	to	national	
policy.	In	2010,	the	“National	Scheme	for	Transport	Infrastructures”	called	for	the	development	
of	an	additional	2,000	kilometers	of	rail	by	2020;	as	of	2015,	France	has	2,037	kilometers	of	tack	
(Crozet,	2014).	A	study	of	high	speed	rail	development	cots	in	2013	estimated	that	each	
kilometer	of	new	infrastructure	costs	around	15	million	euros	to	lay	(Henn	et	al.).	Given	these	
numbers,	an	additional	2,000	kilometers	would	cost	about	30	billion	euros,	a	doubling	of	the	
RFF’s	2013	debt.		
Clearly,	there	is	a	disconnect	between	the	wants	of	policymakers	and	the	funding	available	for	
lofty	expansion	projects.	It	is	this	type	of	policy	to	budget	mismatch	which	led	the	RFF	and	the	
SNCF	before	it	to	accrue	large	amounts	of	debt.	The	solution	has	seemingly	been	to	engage	in	
public-private	partnerships.	France	has	four	P3	financed	HSR	projects	in	the	pipeline:	the	Sud	
Europe	Atlantique	(previously	discussed),	the	Franco-Spanish	cross	border,	the	Bretagne	Pays	
de	la	Loire,	and	the	Countournement	Nimes	(Henn	et	al.,	2013).	However,	studies	of	mature	
P3s	awarded	in	the	rail	sector	have	shown	little	promise	(Crozet,	2014).		
An	analysis	of	the	Tours-Bordeaux	line	exposes	the	financial	obligation	of	the	SNCF	as	a	clear	
limitation	of	the	design,	finance,	build,	run	and	maintain	concessionaire	agreement.	France’s	
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financial	crisis	has	resulted	in	unanticipated	reductions	in	ridership,	as	predicted	by	the	SNCF.	
The	concessionaire	has	the	upper	hand	given	that	they	set	the	tolls	for	the	next	50	years	and	do	
not	have	to	renegotiate	the	terms	until	18	months	after	opening	(Gradt,	2015).	A	review	of	27	
P3s	in	rail	showed	that	concessionaires	“make	over-optimistic	ridership	forecasts”	(Crozet,	
2014).	Clearly	the	Sud	Europe	Atlantique	agreement	is	no	exception.	A	benefit	of	this	public-
private	partnership	is	that	the	risk	of	building	and	financing	is	assumed	by	the	private	entity.	
Given	they	shoulder	this	liability,	they	are	incentivized	to	stay	on	schedule	and	within	budget.	
The	Tours-Bordeaux	line	spanning	340	kilometers,	was	engineered	in	‘record	time’	ahead	of	
schedule,	only	38	months	(Gradt,	2015).	The	sooner	they	finish	construction,	the	sooner	they	
are	able	to	collect	revenue	through	concessions.	Whether	or	not	this	was	a	sound	deal	
financially	for	the	SNCF	remains	uncertain	until	the	line	opens	in	2017	and	the	concession	
matures.			
French	HSR	as	a	Model?	
A	review	of	the	literature	published	on	the	benefits	and	limitations	of	implementing	High	Speed	
Rail	in	the	United	States	reveals	that	the	French	system	is	often	cited	as	a	model	of	successful	
HSR	development	to	be	reproduced.	This	literature	bases	French	success	on	the	TGV’s	ability	to	
provide	reliable	service	and	“free	up	capacity	for	freight	trains”	(Ashiabor	et	al.,	2013);	its	ability	
to	increase	economic	ties	between	regions	and	capitals	(Garmendia	et	al.,	2012);	result	in	a	
high	rate	of	social	return	(Henn	et	al.,	2013);	“competitiveness	over	other	modes”	with	high	
speeds	leading	to	short	travel	times	(Eidlin,	2015);	catalyze	city	development	through	HSR	
access	(Eidlin,	2015).		
However,	what	these	articles	fail	to	consider	when	using	France	as	a	model	for	HSR	
development	is	the	debt	which	has	ensued.	When	the	first	high	speed	rail	line	opened	in	France	
the	country	was	governed	by	Francois	Mitterrand,	a	socialist	(Encyclopedia	Britannica).	
Socialism	provided	the	political	context	for	breaking	ground	on	subsequent	high	speed	rail	lines	
with	lower	net	return	(less	profitable)	but	high	rates	of	social	return	(Henn	et	al.,	2013).		
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The	political	economy	of	the	United	States	is	capitalism,	where	projects	are	seldom	built	when	
they	are	not	estimated	to	have	a	return	on	investment	above	a	given	threshold.	Understanding	
the	political	economy	in	which	large	infrastructure	projects	are	being	undertaken	is	critical	to	
their	success;	without	creative	funding	strategies	and	realistic	revenue	projections,	many	HSR	
projects	cannot	sustain	themselves.	Planners	should	ask	themselves	who	is	paying	upfront,	if	
there	is	enough	funding	secured,	and	who	the	burden	would	fall	upon	if	the	line	does	not	
generate	forecasted	revenue.		
Conclusion	
France	is	often	referred	to	as	a	successful	example	of	high	speed	rail	development.	Indeed,	the	
country	was	the	first	in	Europe	to	have	HSR	and	it	now	boasts	over	100	million	passengers	a	
year	but	the	SNCF	is	in	many	ways	still	maturing	(Freemark,	2011).	The	agency	has	experienced	
two	major	rail	reforms	in	the	last	20	years	and	experimented	with	three	unique	financing	
methods.	
This	paper	sought	to	examine	the	history	of	the	SNCF	in	order	to	better	understand	the	root	
cause	of	the	debt	and	whether	it	was	incurred	for	a	social	good	or	due	to	a	misuse	of	funds.	
Seemingly,	the	debt	has	undertaken	been	to	create	a	practical	network	of	rapid	transportation	
which	connects	a	country,	its’	cities	and	its	people.	However,	it	is	too	soon	to	be	able	to	
conclude	if	the	SNCF	has	found	a	sustainable	financing	method	through	public-private	
partnerships.		
Perhaps	Campos	and	De	Rus	(2009)	said	it	best,	“[HSR]	is	a	very	expensive	and	risky	
transportation	system	that	requires	careful	case-by-case	socioeconomic	appraisal”.	Further	
research	needs	to	be	carried	out	when	the	four	P3s	currently	under	construction	have	been	in	
operation	for	a	few	years	before	other	countries	look	to	the	French	HSR	development	as	a	
model	for	their	own.		
Lessons	learned	from	this	research:	
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- Separation	of	rail	operations	and	management	leads	to	failure;	even	when	both	
agencies	are	public	they	are	competing	for	the	same	funds	
- If	possible,	negotiate	long-term	subsidies,	for	a	set	amount,	from	the	State;	healthy	
financial	planning	cannot	occur	without	it	
- Borrow	and	build	when	interest	rates	are	low	
- Social	returns	are	not	monetary	returns;	they	cannot	be	the	only	reason	for	construction	
unless	the	state	or	other	government	agencies	will	foot	a	part	of	the	bill	
- Reshuffling	debt	between	agencies	does	not	make	it	disappear,	it	just	pushes	it	around	
- P3	contracts	have	to	include	stipulations	in	which	public	agencies	are	not	held	liable	for	
private	sector’s	over-projected	ridership,	through	fees	or	tolls	
- ‘Build	and	they	will	come’	is	not	always	the	case;	what	alternatives	are	there	to	rail,	how	
much	do	they	cost,	will	they	jeopardize	HSR’s	ridership?	
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